

Riffle was developed by researchers at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne. In experiments, it required only one-tenth as much time as similarly secure experimental systems to transfer a large file between anonymous users. Meanwhile, Riffle also uses bandwidth much more efficiently than competing systems, its creators say. The overall result is that Riffle remains cryptographically secure as long as one server in the mixnet remains uncompromised, according to MIT.

Verifiable shuffle keeps things secure while each user and each mixnet server agree upon a cryptographic key authentication encryption, which is much more efficient, then takes over for the remainder of the communication session. Essentially, it takes a two-pronged approach to validating the authenticity of messages using techniques called verifiable shuffle and authentication encryption. That's where Riffle's third protective measure comes in. Then it could passively track the one message that doesn’t follow its own prespecified route. If one has commandeered a mixnet router and wants to determine the destination of a particular message, for instance, it could simply replace all the other messages it receives with its own, bound for a single destination. Riffle consists of a small set of anonymity servers and a large number of users, and guarantees anonymity as long as there exists at least one honest server. But active adversaries, which can infiltrate servers with their own code, are another matter. More details about Riffle will be presented at the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium in July, in Darmstadt, Germany.A mixnet used with onion encryption is protected against passive adversaries, which can only observe network traffic. While HORNET was ready for testing and its creators were bragging about being faster and more secure than Tor as well, Vuvuzela was nowhere near a production-ready state. Previous efforts to create a better anonymity network included projects such as HORNET or MIT's Vuvuzela. Researchers say that file transfers required one-tenth of the time as compared to other anonymity networks. This message is used to establish secure connections to all servers along a message's path.Īfter the first message, the rest of the communication channel uses a less CPU-intensive authentication and encryption system that is still secure enough and also provides better speeds for data transfers, when compared to Tor. This is done by sending the first message of a communication channel to all servers on the Riffle network. "he encryption can be done in such a way that the server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid manipulations of the ones it receives," MIT explains. Riffle uses a two-phase authentication systemįor Sybil attacks, Riffle uses a technique called "verifiable shuffle," which works on top of the Onion protocol.

So an attacker will still have to break several layers of encryption to reach Riffle content. Riffle does not completely overhaul how Tor works because it still uses the groundbreaking Onion protocol to encrypt its messages with different levels of encryption, which are peeled off by every server through which the message travels. If packet A, B, C enter a Riffle server, they will be delayed and shuffled in a random order, and then sent out in a completely different order (for example, C, A, B).Ī threat actor tracking the path of the message will not be able to guess when and which packet that has entered a Riffle node is set to leave. Riffle uses Tor's Onion protocolįirst and foremost, Riffle uses a unique system for shuffling messages around while transiting through servers. To fend off these types of attacks, researchers made some changes to how Tor's basic principles function and created a new anonymity network from scratch. Researchers from MIT and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, in Switzerland, have created a new type of anonymity network, which they claim fixes some of Tor's weak spots.Ĭalled Riffle, their network works similarly to TOR but is hardened against situations when malicious actors introduce rogue servers on the network, a technique known as Sybil attack, to which Tor is vulnerable.
